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
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5 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, NRO

SUBJECT : Contingency Planning for Project
OX CART

25X1 1. I am glad to note in your memorandum of January 29 that it appears feasible to hold all OXCART-type vehicles at  at least until January 1965. This will greatly assist in helping to avoid surfacing until an operational capability has been achieved, or until such decision may be taken by the President for other reasons.


2. In this connection, at a meeting held at the White House on November 29, 1963, with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the President decided not to surface at that time and to review the matter again in late January or early February.

/s/

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA

NRO review(s) completed.

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
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MSC:bec

Distribution:

- Cy #1 - D/NRO
- #2 - DDCI
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Deputy Director (Science & Technology)

3 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter

SUBJECT: Contingency Planning for
Project OXCART

1. McMillan's memorandum of 29 January on contingency planning for Project OXCART has one significant quotation:

"...no decision to direct implementation will be taken without the specific authorization from the Secretary of Defense to surface the R-12."

As the result of the event of Friday last when McNamara attempted to do precisely this, I believe we now understand what McMillan had in mind. Fubini's role in the DOD ploy, I presume, became clear in his telephone conversation with you. I believe we must also assume that McMillan was party to the affair.

2. Since we have laid down the law to DOD on this matter, I propose that

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ALBERT D. WHEELON

you dictate a memorandum to
McMillan setting him straight
on this point by making quite
explicit that it is the Director
of Central Intelligence who will
make the basic decision as to
whether the OX vehicle will be
surfaced. Certainly after the
events of this past weekend
we are only reiterating the
position we have now made quite
strongly.

Albert D. Wheelon

Attach:

Copy 1

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY			
ILLEGIB OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
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ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

General Carter has read the attached and asked that it be sent to you for your study and comments. General Carter particularly noted the wording of the last sentence of the first paragraph.

STAT

H. Knoche

STAT

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER	
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
EA/DDCI 7 D6011	1/30/64

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